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1. Introduction
Since the 1950s, when the wave of decolonisation beganto sweep through Africa, the continent has gonethrough several changing perspectives of developmentapproaches. Hyden (1993) characterises the discourse
on development as having passed through four cycles:
modernisation (195565), dependency (196575), popular
participation (197585) and enabling environment (1985). This
moved the paradigm from development being measured purely
in terms of economic stages of development to the wholesome
term of human development (ibid.). More specifically,
development should imply improving the readiness and ability
of societies to problematise issues. In other words, development
becomes meaningful to people when they have a chance to
wrestle with end/means relations in ways that are relevant to
their own predicament. It was symptomatic of this shift that by
the end of the 1980s terms such as people-centred development
(World Commission on the Environment 1987), sustainable
development (ibid.) and sustainable livelihoods (Chambers &
Conway 1992) became increasingly common in development
language.1
Towards the end of the 1980s, several development co-
operation agencies carried out evaluation of fisheries projects in
order to draw lessons from the previous four decades of failures
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in fisheries projects (Spliethoff et al. 1990). The main lesson was
that the failures were attributable to the creation of
interventions that did not take into account the special
characteristics of capture fisheries, given the complexity of the
fisheries sector, the special bio-ecological characteristics of
fisheries and the prevalent low social and political status of
fishing communities in terms of government priorities. The
conclusion from this evaluation was that there was need for
more careful and comprehensive preparation involving wider
consultation and active participation of beneficiaries, flexible
and phased approaches with emphasis on the development of
human resources (ibid:2).
The end of the Cold War era brought with it increasing
demands from its traditional Western donors, led by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for Africa to
democratise and implement Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs). This also came at a time when there was a marked shift
in the resource management paradigm towards participatory
approaches, devolution of authority and decentralisation of
powers. Thus by the early 1990s, user participation (and
Participatory Rural Appraisal  PRA) had become almost a given
requirement for donor-funded development projects. Given this
context, the international donor agencies pressured African
countries to introduce co-management or at least establish more
democratic processes in the formulation of fisheries
management objectives and the decentralisation of fisheries
governance.
This paper provides an overview of co-management in Africa
and the historical, political and paradigmatic reasons for the
shift. The historical context is important when analysing the
performance of the regime. The main reasons why co-
management is being increasingly adopted in Africa are
explained by analysing the objectives hereof. The paper
evaluates what is meant by co-management in the African
context using the variety of types of user involvement in practice
and the standard continuum of possible arrangements under
the co-management regime. Next, it will look at how co-
management is being implemented, including whether it is
achieving the objectives it is supposed to achieve. The final
section will discuss and draw some lessons from the co-
management experience on the continent.
The paper draws on experiences from southern Africa
(Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe),
East Africa (Lake Victoria grouping  Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda) and West Africa (Benin, Congo, Ivory Coast, Senegal,
etc.) where co-management arrangements in fisheries have been
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or are in the process of being implemented.2 In most of these
countries, fisheries co-management is a relatively new approach
that has only been formally introduced in the last five to eight
years. The comparative analysis of the cases at this early stage
could give indications of what seem to be the critical issues in
the planning and implementation of fisheries co-management
arrangements in Africa.
2. Reasons for adopting co-management
While the arguments and decisions leading toadoption of the co-management approach mightvary in specific cases, the most common andpowerful reason has been the failure of governments
to effectively manage capture fisheries, resulting in over-
exploitation (Hara, et al. 2002; Donda 1998; Jackson et al.
1998; Sowman et al. 1998; Horemans & Jallow 1998;
Kponhassia & Konan 1998; Kebe 1998; Geheb & Crean 2000).
In other cases, governments view co-management as a way of
controlling fishing effort by establishing property rights for some
groups in order to forestall future problems of over capacity. This
is one of the major reasons on Lake Kariba (Hachongela et al.
1998; Machena & Kwaramba 1995), on Lake Nokoue in Benin
(Atti-mama 1998) and Lake Chiuta in Malawi (Donda 2001). Co-
management is also seen as a tool for conflict mediation among
various stakeholders. This was the particular objective in
Senegal (Kebe 1998), on Lake Kariba (Hachongela et al. 1998;
Jackson et al. 1998), the Oliphants River (Sowman et al. 1998)
and in Mozambique (Lopes 1998).
The implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs) in most African countries3 and changing economic
development funding priorities in the donor community have
made decentralisation and delegation of management
responsibilities a very attractive proposition. Thus, user-
participation or co-management has become mainstream in
management of fisheries in Africa.
It should be noted that decentralisation and delegation of
authority for the management of natural resources is not new in
Africa. The British had tried it under an approach that was
called indirect rule (Mamdani 1996) in their colonies in Africa.4
A similar system of decentralisation was also practiced by the
French in their African colonies based on the cercle (ibid.).
These approaches were based on authority being vested in local
chiefs who were empowered to make by-laws and collect local
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taxes as a basis for control in their local areas of jurisdiction. In
Mozambique, the Portuguese tried to use the traditional leaders,
the mwenes, for their own political and economic interests.
Their functions were primarily to collect licence fees, taxes and
dues from fishing communities (Lopes et al. 1998). Such
approaches were contrary to what the colonialists practiced in
their own countries, where centralised control was seen as the
solution to the management of common property resources.
On gaining independence, most Africa governments passed
legislation putting the management of fisheries solely in the
hands of government, mainly for reasons of wanting to have total
political control (Hviding & Jul-Larsen 1995). The new states felt
that they needed all the sources of power they could muster. To
leave the control of important natural resources in the hands of
partly competing political institutions at the local level was
considered unacceptable (ibid.). The centralised approach was
also well suited to the different political regimes that had
succeeded colonial rule in Africa, whether they were socialist
planned economies (leftist) as in Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia
and Zimbabwe or the autocratic rule which for many years was
the situation in Malawi and Kenya (rightist) or under apartheid
as practised in South Africa until 1994. In addition, the
management problems and requirements for intervention at the
time did not necessarily call for a consideration of the need for
change in the management approach. Generally, the centralised
approach was maintained in African countries after their
independence mainly because this approach was being applied
by industrialised countries, whose influence continued after
independence through financial and technical aid and the
Western training of African fisheries managers. In reality
though, the ability of governments for practical intervention
never really matched the laws in the statutes, due to budgetary
constraints and the prevailing characteristics of African artisanal
fisheries, which tend to be small-scale operations spread out
through the coastal areas, whereby fishers usually land their
catch in their home villages or constantly migrate following
better catches.
The arguments for indirect rule under the British or French
colonial era were similar to those currently being used for
decentralisation and devolvement of authority. Since
government is far removed from the day-to-day aspects
concerned with the exploitation of fish resources, its
management interventions have usually been ineffectual. Given
this context, it would be best to decentralise and devolve
authority to the lowest possible level.
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3. Objectives for co-management
While the primary stakeholders (the users and thestate) in a co-management arrangement mightshare a broad common goal  the recovery and/orsustainable exploitation of the fishery, in order to
enhance the socio-economic benefits of the user communities
from exploitation of the resource  this commonality might not
be explicitly reflected in the way co-management might be
viewed as a strategy for achieving such a goal.
In the main, government objectives remain attempting to
ensure biological sustainability of the resource and maintaining
biodiversity (Hauck & Sowman 2001; Hara 2001; Geheb &
Crean 2000; Machena & Kwaramba 1995; Hachongela et al.
1998). In this sense, governments see co-management as an
alternative strategy for controlling fishers in the wake of
evidence of mounting problems under the centrally directed
regimes. Thus, the same existing regulations (technical
regulations such as mesh size, net length and closed seasons)
are reformulated under the central direction of the government,
only this time with the supposed participation and support of
fishermen under more democratic and transparent
arrangements. The content and structure of the regulations
though remains largely unchanged. Here, the concern is that
inputs from fishermen, especially those that might seem
contrary to governments conservation objectives, are usually
ignored. What governments hope for is that the communities
will take up responsibilities, especially those concerning the
enforcement of regulations in their areas, a task that
government itself has been unable to fulfil adequately. Thus,
while the decision-making powers largely remain with
governments, communities are being expected to implement the
decisions with greater zeal.
Whereas most rural fisher communities might have fished for
subsistence in former times, the integration of rural
communities into the market economies has shifted fisheries
exploitation into the realm of profit motives. The objectives of
most fishers are clearly economic, other than just subsistence.
The structure of fishing operations in most fishing communities,
whereby a unit owner employs crewmembers or assistants,
means that the decision-making at the operational level goes
beyond the net owner. For most of the crewmembers or
assistants, fishing is usually an economic safety net, enabling
them to etch out a daily living. Who is a fisher and what their
objectives for fishing are is, therefore, more diffuse and complex.
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For fishing communities, the short-term economic objectives
tend to be higher than long-term conservation objectives, given
their dire economic conditions.
From the early 1990s, donors have demanded political
democracy and transparency as essential conditionalities for
development aid.
In addition, donor projects in the resource management
sector have drawn inspiration from some precepts of the World
Bank Structural Adjustment, including the notion that the
central state should play a reduced role in directing and
managing economic activity (Lawry 1994). The assumption is
that local institutions are more accountable and have greater
advantage over central state authority, since they function at a
level where self-interest and responsibility for sustainable
resource management are potentially greater. Co-management
is expected to improve the efficacy of fisheries management,
because it is assumed that acceptance of management measures
will be higher when fishing communities have been involved in
the decision-making process, and also the contents of
management measures will be better reflected if users
knowledge has been included in their formulation (Jentoft
1994).
Thus, user-participation in resource management has
increasingly come as one of the conditions for donor aid as it is
believed that this will result in greater accountability. It is also
seen as part of the general drive towards empowering the
formerly disenfranchised populace.5 The main goal of donors
can be stated as being to achieve the best possible use of their
funds that would result in positive socio-economic outcomes for
the target communities. Donors seem to believe that the
subsidiarity principle commonly being applied in the West
should also be applied in developing countries, and that political
empowerment of user communities in the resource
management process would result in improved resource
management and thus positive economic effects on user
communities.
While these enforced moves towards democracy and greater
participation for the local communities are laudable, they have,
in most instances, caught government officials and user
communities unprepared. The former have had to accept to
implement user participation in order to get the much needed
money into their cash strapped budgets, while the latter are still
suspicious as to why all of a sudden the government has turned
round and is telling them that they have to participate in the
management process, to the extent of being forcibly co-opted.
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4. What passes for co-management in Africa?
There are quite a number of forms of user involvement inthe management of fisheries that we find in Africa.Whether all these should be called co-management is amatter for debate. In South Africa, it is enshrined in the
Constitution of 1996 and in other policies and legislation
concerned with natural resource management that people must
be involved in decisions concerning their lives and natural
resources they are entitled to (Hauck & Sowman 2001) following
democracy in 1994. The revision of apartheid-era laws and
regulations thus goes through formal political processes aimed
at making provision for inputs from stakeholders and the public.
During apartheid, the commercial industry in South Africa had
established arrangements with government that involved the
exchange of information (Hutton & Pitcher 1998). The formation
of formal structures was formalised by the Sea Fishery Act of
1988, which stated that the minister could recognise any
industry body or interest group to advise and make
recommendations to government (Hauck & Sowman 2001). A
formal structure that has been put in place following the new
Act of 1998 is the Consultative Advisory Forum, which is
supposed to provide management advice directly to the minister.
This forum is comprised of invited members from industry, the
public and outside research institutions.
In countries that adopted socialism at independence such as
Mozambique and Tanzania, co-operatives or villagisation were
practised. Engagement with government had emanated from
this. On the Zambian side of Lake Kariba, the governments
approach to limiting entry and engaging with fishermen was
based on moving fishers into centralised villages. In Zimbabwe,
co-management is based on the Communal Areas Management
Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) principles,
which give appropriate authority to Rural District Councils. In
most of the countries in Africa, though, modern era user-
participation has its basis in a new philosophy of sustainable
rural development through the extraction and exploitation of
their natural renewable resources (Derman 1995; WCED
1987). The problem is for governments to ensure that this is
achieved without endangering the biological sustainability of the
resources. Most countries have revised their Fisheries Acts in
order to provide for enabling legislation and provide for
decentralisation and devolution of powers.
In almost all co-management arrangements in Africa,6
governments have the legal authority, but have voluntarily
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decided to devolve some aspects of management to fishing
communities according to very discrete and specific agreements
concerning particular functions. This type of approach is the
top-down, vertical contracting out model as described by
Berkes (1997), Sen and Nielsen (1996), Pomeroy et al. (1995)
and Berkes et al. (1991).7 This model views power as moving
from the state to communities. With the exception of a few cases
such as Lake Chiuta in Malawi (Hara et al. 2002) and some
inland Lakes in West Africa (Horemans & Jallow 1998). Most
African co-management arrangements are top-down heavy (Sen
& Nielsen 1996).
5. How has co-management been implemented?
The introduction of co-management arrangements inAfrica has to a large extent been initiated as donor-funded projects,8 with the assumption that nationaldepartments could take over the activities at the end of
the projects. This has not been without its problems, since in
many cases the assistance has been short-term and the process
has lacked flexibility, because of specific donor requirements
that needed to be applied.
In most cases, organisation of user communities has been the
first step of the implementation process. Government or NGOs
representing the government have initiated and mobilised the
communities for user involvement in the new management
regime. New institutions are created, with the facilitation of
these external agencies, usually using the Western democratic
principles of electing committees as vehicles for participation.
These community organisations in co-management
arrangements have different names in different countries. In
Malawi, they are called Beach Village Committees, in Zambia
Fishing Village Management Committees, in Tanzania Beach
Management Units or Management Committees, while in
Zimbabwe they are referred to as Management Committees for
Exclusive Fishing Zones (based on the specially demarcated
areas of the inshore fishery by government). Although new
institutional structures have been created, the local institutional
structures based on traditional authority and customary law are
in most cases still the basis for organisation of the fishing
communities. A few exceptions can be found. In Zimbabwe,
based on the principles of scientific socialism, the government
sought to dilute the influence of traditional authority and, in
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 9
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this context, the traditional authorities (chiefs) have been
ignored or declared improper for the task. In the case of the
Oliphants River project in South Africa, the coloured
community in question do not have traditional authority
structures.
Hauck and Sowman (2001) point out that in South Africa
most of the initiatives have been driven by external agents
outside the responsible government department and that thus
far there has been a lack of buy-in into the idea of co-
management by government. This lack of total acceptance of
communities as equal partners (or slow warming to the idea of
co-management) by government fisheries management
departments also largely applies to most of the other countries.
In general, the fact that, in most cases, community structures
had been organised by or through the influence of agents from
outside the communities has had a large bearing on the
ownership of the process and the acceptability of the new
committees intended to be representative bodies for
communities in a co-management arrangement. In turn, the
stability of the elected co-management structures has had great
influence on the sustainability of the new regime.
6. Lessons from the African experience
Officially, most co-management arrangements on thecontinent have been going on for less than ten years.Most of them have been introduced and driven bygovernments and remain largely top-down. All the
same, it is possible to start drawing some lessons concerning
the African experiences with co-management arrangements
meant to govern fisheries exploitation. In the discussion of
lessons, focus will be given to objectives for co-management,
issues related to participation and representation, the role of
traditional authority and the institutional capacity for co-
management.
6.1 Conflicting objectives: Conservation vs. economic subsistence
In the African cases we have investigated, co-management
seems to be a government-driven initiative with underlying
conservation objectives. Governments generally perceive co-
management as an alternative strategy to pursue the same old
conservation objectives. Thus, the government approach is
rather instrumental, based on co-opting users into the process,
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without really relinquishing management authority and control
of decision-making power. Governments hope to achieve better
outcomes in terms of sustainable patterns of fisheries
exploitation by changing the time preference for exploitation of
fish resources within communities from short- to long-term
through user participation in the management process. The
expectations for involvement within communities might not be
the same as governments, is seldom so and is more likely to be
contradictory.
Most people in fishing communities, especially where income
from fishing is vital for their livelihood, focus on economic
objectives. In most cases, the effects of poverty and lack of
alternative economic opportunities for the communities, due
to the overall macro-economic situation in Africa, drives up
their rate of time preference to the point where only daily
consumption matters. The question then becomes whether
co-management alone can change their economic strategies.
This has been stated as one of the main problems on Lake
Malombe (Hara et al. 2002) and Lake Victoria (Geheb & Crean
2000).
This last factor highlights the fact that achieving sustainable
exploitation of the fisheries in most water bodies is likely to be
dependant on the broadening of economic opportunities and
general economic development in the rural communities
concerned. The point is that as populations grow and economic
needs increase, pressure on fisheries is bound to increase from
the horizontal growth of effort, unless alternative outlets in
terms of employment outside the fishery can be created. In this
sense, one cannot separate fisheries management issues from
economic development issues.
Jul-Larsen et al. (2002) have emphasised the need for caution
about the general assumption that there is  a need to control
effort in some small and medium fresh water lakes in the SADC
region, because in the case of Lakes Chirwa, Mweru and Kariba,
there are no clear links between the level of fishing effort and
the biological resilience of the resource and ecological systems.
There is very little biological evidence to support the need for
control of fishing effort. Thus, the use of co-management to
meet conservation concerns might be misconceived on the part
of government.
6.2 Property rights, exclusion and limited access
It has been common from a government perspective that co-
management has been seen as a vehicle for establishing or
ensuring property rights for local fishing communities to fish
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resources. Granting property rights has been one of the major
reasons for adopting co-management for many fishing
communities. The underlying perception is that better resource
management can be promoted through policies that give the
communities stronger incentives for sound resource use
through reforms that extend clear property rights to them.
Having acquired exclusive rights, it is expected that fishing
communities would limit access and thereby fishing effort.
Whereas in the past community members had been free to
enter and leave the fishery, limited entry proposes that a
specific group of individuals should have exclusive rights to the
resource with the ability to keep others out. In the face of
shrinking job markets, dependency on natural resources to
meet basic needs is increasing. In most instances, communities
have been adamant about the proposal to introduce limited
entry and limited access, due to the implications of these as
forms of privatisation of a common pool resource in which
everyone has historically been free to fish. Secondly, fishing
communities have felt that this would risk them being excluded
from other areas to which they seasonally migrate during the
closed season as a tit-for-tat by other communities from those
areas (Hara et al. 2002; Geheb & Crean 2000; Horemans &
Jallow 1998). In this context, propositions aimed at limiting
entry or access have been difficult to implement. In the words of
Brox (1992:232):
the Common Property Theory exposes the tragic potential of
natural resources being free and accessible to all, but it
easily prevents one from seeing that commons involve
opportunities which are far from being tragic for the people
involved, but rather necessary for the maintenance of local
communities. Of special importance are the opportunities
that common resources like fish offer to anybody looking for
subsistence or resources that can be turned into cash.
Broxs observation can never be far from the reality of the
situation in Africa, and is supported by Jul-Larsen et al. (2002)
in their study of small and medium freshwater lakes in
southern Africa.
Thus, the link between fisheries and the general economy
and the formers ability to act as a sink for excess labour from
the fishing community is becoming clear. So long as
employment opportunities in the other sectors of the economy
remain low9 and fisheries continue to act as the major economic
sector in rural areas, limiting entry to fisheries is going to be
difficult, if not impossible. Here also is a warning that any new
management regimes, whether co-management or any other
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type, which bring any unpalatable changes to the existing
social and economic order of the fishing communities might be
unimplementable even if they made sense to governments
biological conservation objectives. In any case, official
government worries about limiting effort as a management
objective might be misconstrued in some of the small water
bodies in the SADC region, as Jul-Larsen et al. (2002) have
demonstrated. The authors show that in some of these water
bodies there might be no reason to control effort and that the
importance of such resources lies in their ability and resilience
to act as a buffer for absorbing the socio-economic needs of
constantly changing local macro-economic situations of the
dependent communities, without endangering the productivity
of the resource in question.
6.3 Level of participation
The practical adaptation of co-management in Africa has been to
involve fishing communities in the implementation process  a
rather instrumental approach to co-management. In a few cases,
fishing communities/user groups have been consulted in the
decision-making process concerning determination of technical
regulations such as gear type restrictions (minimum mesh size
and maximum length of seine or gill nets), closed seasons and
protected areas. However, the knowledge base for these
management decisions has been scientific knowledge provided
by government departments. The justification or reasoning
behind such knowledge is seldom clearly explained to fishers. In
addition, the scientific rationale for the applied technical
regulations remains questionable (Jul-Larsen et al. 2002). Thus,
it is clear that governments generally do not perceive co-
management as a means of introducing more democratic
principles into fisheries management, but as an instrument for
reaching their own management objectives more efficiently
through involving communities in the implementation and
monitoring activities. Governments have generally not been
prepared to include the setting of management objectives as
part of the co-management process and the determination of
what knowledge from fisher communities should be included in
the management decisions. In the fishers experience, the
government always sets the rules and regulations and has the
responsibility for enforcement. In summary, most co-
management arrangements in Africa exclude fishing
communities from the decision-making process regarding who
should participate in making the operational rules, which the
co-management arrangements were supposed to be about
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 13
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(Sverdrup-Jensen & Nielsen 1998). Unless users are genuinely
allowed and empowered to participate in the setting of
management objectives on equal terms with government, co-
management cannot really be considered as a serious
institutional innovation. If co-management is put forward as a
process of empowerment and self-determination, communities
might believe that it will lead to powers of decision-making,
including decisions that might be contrary to those of
government.
Control and law enforcement continues to be mainly
undertaken by government departments. In some such cases, as
in Malawi, one of the arguments for co-management was to
make the BVCs responsible for enforcing operational rules in
conjunction with the Department of Fisheries. Apart from
governments willingness to devolve responsibility for this type of
task, another problem has been the capacity and willingness on
the part of local communities to undertake such tasks.
Irrespective of the type of political system that has been in
place in the past, fishers trust in government authorities has
always at best been moderate. Fishers have hardly ever found
themselves at the winning end of relationships with
government. Therefore, wherever initiatives to establish co-
management have been taken by government authorities, these
have been met with profound scepticism from fishers, who, with
good reason, are suspicious of the motives and sincerity of
government authorities when they propose collaboration and
the sharing of management responsibilities. Thus, unless
governments show willingness to build trust and bring about
the democratisation of the processes of fisheries governance, the
incentive to give collaborative management arrangements with
government a try is likely to decline.
Although some governments are genuinely trying to
introduce real institutional changes, one still finds that in most
instances fishing communities are not legally empowered, and
their negotiating position versus that of governments is still
comparatively weak. As Chirwa (1998:69) points out: The local
user communities are the recipients rather than the initiators of
decisions. They, themselves, are managed, together with their
resources. This statement seems to be applicable to most of the
examples of co-management from Africa and serves to
emphasise the need for enabling legislation regarding co-
management or operationalising such legislation where it exists,
in order to empower user groups. Governments generally seem
reluctant to devolve power and bestow legal rights and authority
for fisheries management to user groups. Devolution of
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 14
A decade of fisheries co-management in Africa
Mafaniso Hara and Jesper Raakjær Nielsen
management authority is obviously a sensitive issue for most
governments and one that does not seem to be easily resolved,
as it requires changes in laws, policies and administrative
procedures, a process that can be both cumbersome and time-
consuming.
The issue of scale is crucial, and not all problems and issues
can be solved at the local level. The African experiences support
this argument. It appears as if the scale issue is somewhat
easier to deal with in small freshwater lake fisheries such as in
Lakes Nokoue, Mweru and Chiuta, whereas it is more
complicated in the large freshwater lakes like Malawi and
Victoria or marine fisheries, e.g. the shrimp fishery in
Mozambique or the pelagic fishery in South Africa. The latter
fisheries are good examples of resource systems being too
large to be controlled entirely by a few communities. Fisheries
(co-)management institutions must, therefore, be able to
address problems of resource access and distribution above local
level. One of the solutions to this problem of scale lies in the
issue of representation (Mikalsen 1998). This, however, raises a
new set of problems related to the mechanisms that could
ensure genuine representation, in order to avoid alienation
between communities and management. The fact that the co-
management institutions (local committees) exist within nested
systems compounds the problem. The African examples clearly
indicate that local communities have difficulties in getting their
views articulated through the different layers of the decision-
making hierarchy in larger-scale environments. In addition, the
local communities, as in the case of the Mozambican shrimp
fishery and the pelagic fishery in South Africa, are up against
very well-organised associations representing larger integrated
companies. Thus, local communities are often at the losing end
when decisions are taken.
6.4 The role of traditional authority
As explained above, African co-management institutions have
generally been established at the local level and most often have
been closely linked to existing traditional power structures.
Traditional power systems in Africa play a very prominent role in
relation to resource exploitation. In African fisheries co-
management arrangements, traditional authorities serve as the
link between the government and communities/user groups. As
a consequence, co-management arrangements are in many
cases rooted in traditional customs, practices and beliefs,
religious institutions and myths that influence the decision-
making process.
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 15
No.       Occasional Paper Series20
It can be argued that the heavy involvement of traditional
authorities in co-management arrangements adds a twist to an
arrangement that, in the strict Western understanding, should
be between direct users and government. On the other hand,
such tripartite arrangements build upon and involve institutions
that are considered legitimate by fishing communities. To use a
Weber terminology (Selznick 1992), the legitimacy of this type of
co-management arrangement is likely to be based on a
combination of traditional and charismatic authority. The
sustainability of such an arrangement will, to a large extent,
rely on the personality of the chief and how his subjects regard
him. In order to make co-management arrangements able to
apply sanctions on their own at local level, they often will need
the civil and customary power structures that reside in
traditional authorities. In any case, traditional leaders and
elders have historically been, and are still, highly respected in
rural areas.
It is, however, not without its problems that co-management
arrangements in Africa are closely linked to the traditional
authority system. Empowering user groups has created tensions
between traditional authorities and the co-management
institutions in their areas (Hara et al. 2002; Jackson et al.
1998). In addition, traditional authorities view the process of
democratisation with suspicion (with good reason on their part),
because it most likely undermines their authority. This will have
direct impact on the resiliency of the co-management
institutions. Co-management initiatives may change perceptions
within the fishing community and the government on what are
considered to be legitimate management institutions. A major
challenge for co-management in Africa is how to include the
traditional institutions. It is obvious that they cannot remain in
the driving seat if co-management is concerned with
empowerment of communities. At the same time, they are also
too important to be excluded, as this would undermine the
virtues of co-management arrangements.
6.5 Capacity of local communities and governments for co-management
Not all tasks that are inherent in a co-management arrangement
can be undertaken by community organisations in all situations.
In many cases, fishing communities may neither be willing to,
nor capable of, taking on general or specific fisheries management
responsibilities/tasks. Furthermore, not all elements of fisheries
management can, or should, be allocated to the communities,
due to the fact that the incentive(s)  economic, social and/or
political  to undertake major fisheries management
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responsibilities may not be present within the community. In
cases such as Lake Malombe, where initially the incentives were
seen as being monetary, and these could not be sustained
because they were being drawn from short-term donor project
funds, willingness to accept responsibilities on the committees
declined. Another problem is related to the low levels of
education and poor organisation among fishing communities.
Thus, capacity-building of the communities and self-sustenance
have been found to be important when it comes to successful
introduction of co-management. Thus, it is crucial that key-
persons or resources10 are not withdrawn before institutions
have matured and the regime has taken root. Where this has
happened, such as in the Lake Malombe and Oliphants River, it
has been observed that the arrangement has been increasingly
under strain and appears to be moving towards collapse. The
lack of capabilities and/or aspirations among fishing
communities to participate in the fisheries management process
might also explain the lack of participation of true fishers in the
decision-making process in some of the cases studied. As stated
by Pinkerton (1989), strong local institutions with human and
financial capacity are a precondition for co-management. In
most small-scale fisheries in Africa, such self-reliant institutions
for management purposes are difficult to find or create.
Support for co-management initiatives from governments
seems to be inadequate. One reason for this might be that there
has not been real adaptation in the organisational structures of
government departments to cope with the change in concept
and philosophy from centralised management towards co-
management. The shift to co-management from centralised
regimes creates new demands on government with respect to
the type of support that they need to provide to fishing
communities. The situation is complicated due to the fact that
most departments were built and geared around attempting to
ensure biological sustainability of fisheries resources. Their
duties have mainly been seen as biological research to come up
with regulations, top-down delivery of extension messages and
enforcement of regulations. As emphasised by Donda (2001), it
is a problem that government departments and their fisheries
research and extension have not been re-organised as part of
the process. Fisheries departments in Africa have usually
recruited people from natural sciences, with no or very few
economists or social scientists. Although the need for new types
of skill is widely recognised, very little has been done to broaden
the skill base of fisheries departments.
One of the reasons for this is that government departments
are being asked to downsize under SAPs. This means that it has
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not been easy to create new positions that would accommodate
the required people with the requisite skills and qualifications.
It has thus not been easy to re-orientate departments, especially
when such dramatic change means re-organisation, change in
management philosophy, new ways of interacting with fishing
communities and the possible threat to the jobs of existing staff.
It, therefore, means that there is usually no clear link between
the organisational structure of the responsible departments and
resources (human and financial) at the their disposal to match
the requirements for the facilitation and implementation of the
new regimes.
7. The challenge for the future of fisheries
co-management in Africa
The implementation of co-management in Africa does notseem to differ from what is going on in other parts ofthe world. Institutions regulating access to fisheries hadin many  if not most  cases been in place long before
modern concepts of fisheries management were developed
(Hviding & Jul-Larsen 1995). The problems that African fishing
communities are facing are, therefore, not necessarily a result of
an absence of management institutions, but rather the result of
the inadequacy of these institutions to deal with the evolving
social, economic and political systems and situations.
Revitalisation of such existing institutions might not, therefore,
necessarily lead to solutions to the problems. The institutions
may have lost their significance exactly because they were set
up to solve other problems and are inadequate to deal with the
present situation. The basic challenge to governance of African
fisheries seems to be how to establish and maintain co-
management institutions (norms and rules guiding decisions,
including a formal framework for decision-making) that will
enable both government and communities to deal with the new
challenges and complexities that come with the responsibilities
for sustainable exploitation of their fisheries resources, nested
in modern economic systems increasingly influenced by the
effects of SAPs and globalisation.
The modern approaches to fisheries management, including
some variations of co-management, have developed within the
modern rationality of industrialised societies. This approach is
inherently unable to address the present problems of fishing
communities in general and in Africa in particular, due to the
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ways objectives are defined and limitations in the knowledge on
which they are based. The overriding problem is the differences
in objectives for fisheries management between government and
fishing communities, and the fact that this aspect is seldom
addressed. What we observe in Africa is the instrumental type of
co-management approach, which does not differ significantly
from the centralised management approach. If co-management
in an African context continues to be instrumental, it is likely
that the regime will lead to the detriment of relations between
government and fishing communities, because the frustrations
among the latter are likely to increase due to the lack of real
and genuine empowerment, as expected at the local level, and
the lack of government support as promised. We have observed
the first signs of collapse of what was considered a successful co-
management arrangement on Malombe in Malawi, according to
Donda (2001) and Hara (2001), because when co-management
was launched it created huge expectations of genuine
participation and empowerment. In practice, though, the
adoption of co-management seems to be turning out to be
business as usual for governments, as no real institutional
reforms are adopted and carried through.
If co-management in Africa moves towards genuine
participation and empowerment it is likely to challenge the
objectives of mainstream international conventions for fisheries
management, such as the Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fishing or the precautionary approach for fisheries
management. These conventions attempt to remove all
uncertainties with respect to stock estimation and fisheries
management implementation, so as to protect the fish stocks,
without taking real cognisance of the needs or wishes of fishing
communities. The approach taken in these international
conventions is very similar to the conventional fisheries
management approach that is increasingly being discredited. In
this context, the international decision-making arenas might
have underestimated the limitations of these conventions when
it comes to how they are to be related to the intended
empowerment of fishing communities through co-management.
In an African context, and many places elsewhere, a balance
between conservation and socio-economic concerns has to be
struck. If not, these conventions are likely to be more harmful
than helpful. Co-management that results in empowerment can
actually facilitate this process, because governments are likely
to be confronted with, and forced to address, the impact of
international conventions on the livelihoods of fishing
communities, when the communities participate in the
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definition of management objectives for specific countries,
locations or fisheries.
This experience could assist national governments to present
and balance various objectives when they participate in forums
where decisions on such international conventions and
agreements are made. The empowerment of fishing
communities through co-management should be seen as a way
of giving fishing communities a chance to influence their own
future and to cope with the impacts of phenomena such as
globalisation, competing use of coastal environments and other
fisheries related issues. Empowerment through the co-
management approach is likely  to a higher degree than
previous or present management approaches  to positively
influence overall management objectives, even in cases where
these objectives might differ from those set by governments.
An important lesson to be drawn from implementation of co-
management in Africa so far is that co-management should not
be seen as a question of constructing local institutions that can
co-operate with government authorities in managing fish
resources. That kind of approach was what had been attempted
by the colonial powers under indirect rule. Co-management
ideally implies a process of mutual adaptation for both
government and fishing communities for the co-ordination of
the existing access-regulating mechanisms (and the underlying
mutual interests they represent) through some form of coherent
mediating systems. Any management regime is political in the
sense that it is bound to include some and exclude others from
access to valuable resources. This points to a dilemma that does
not seem to have been adequately touched upon in the co-
management literature: who is a fisher and who is not and,
therefore, should be excluded? In most African fisheries, the
fishers normally have complex organisational structures. For
example, in the case of Lake Malombe, it is common to find that
most gear owners do not actively participate in the actual
fishing. They employ crewmembers (Hara 2001; Hara et al.
2002). Within the crews, there are specialist roles such as divers
or those who are expert in searching for fish shoals or simply
those who are heads of crew. These various roles determine the
way benefits are shared and also who takes what type of
decision. While the gear owner might make strategic decisions,
he is usually powerless when it comes to making operational
decisions. Furthermore, lack of security of tenure for the
crewmembers means that there is usually great fluidity in terms
of movement in and out of crews and fishing units. Also, some
people participate in fishing during particular times of the year
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only, such as when farming is out of season. An added twist is
the relationship between gear owners and crewmembers and
traders who might provide them with capital or loan the fishers
money during times of stress. In such complex organisational
webs, who are fishers and their level of influence on decisions
and fishing activities is never that clear-cut.
What is clear is that in the African context, most people
within fishing communities or in the vicinity of fish resources
are (potential) fishers. If they are not fishing at a specific given
time, it might simply be that they have better socio-economic
opportunities elsewhere. The cases we have reviewed show that
there are good reasons to maintain things this way. Co-
management systems have had a tendency to define fishers on
the basis of who are present at a specific moment and a specific
place in question. This is not likely to be a very helpful
definition or starting-point for analysis. Malasha (2001) shows
that when various groups of the local population on the
Zambian part of Lake Kariba were able to establish an alliance
of interests to effectively stop newcomers entering the fishery, it
happened as an outcome of a government initiative for co-
management. Since then the number of fishers has fallen
dramatically, which might mean that probably a large amount of
people have lost a valuable opportunity to make a living.
8. Lessons learnt
In this final section, we will try to distil some lessons to belearnt from the implementation and the current status ofco-management in Africa. While the experiences mightnot have been very encouraging up till now, they raise
some important issues and provide valuable lessons about co-
management that need to be addressed in the African context.
Co-management has been applied and implemented
instrumentally by governments. This has created a situation
whereby the process, in contrast to the intention, has not lead
to empowerment of the local fishing population. The incentives
for co-operation are primarily on the side of government, where
fishers/fishing communities have realised that they continue to
be recipients of instructions rather than equal partners in the
decision-making process. A good example is that government
departments and their fisheries research extension services
have not been reorganised, and the inputs to be accommodated
by government have not been changed as a result of the
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changes in emphasis towards a more social and economic
fisheries management (Donda 2001).
In an African context, the control of people seems to have
been a more important concern than considerations for the
resources. Co-management, in many cases, has been going back
to the roots and, at most, differs only slightly from what the
colonial powers attempted under the label of indirect rule.
Based on the past experiences and the present challenges for
African fisheries management, it is generally accepted that
institutional reforms in the governance structures for fisheries
management are required, and co-management is considered
the way forward. The major challenge for fisheries co-
management in Africa is to improve the knowledge base for
management, and we argue that participation of the fishing
communities is a precondition for this. Communities are also
important in the quest to implement reliable monitoring
systems. Based on the experiences from Africa, it is clear that
the way forward on this continent is to move away from the
classical management paradigm towards a more pragmatic and
adaptive approach to management. As it is, co-management
looks like advanced social engineering, influenced by donor
agencies and NGOs without any genuine involvement of the
direct users in the process. Co-management becomes an
illusion. However, this would not be so if co-management is
modified to a mutual adaptation, where one tries to establish a
convergence between government policies and the local
institutional structures. We are aware, given the institutional
landscape in Africa, that this not going to be an easy task, but
rather a long-term process with a lot of muddling through.
Based on African experiences, we argue that co-management in
the region needs to be a learning process for each specific
fishery, with specific tailor-made design needed in each
context.
 Finally, it is important to emphasise that it will be a
troublesome exercise, without any guarantee for success. It is
the only realistic alternative route, though, to follow in order to
improve the efficacy of fisheries management in Africa.
Empowering user groups/fishing communities raises the
question of whether these groups can act as independent
participators, their organisation having been facilitated by
government. In addition, to what extent are government
agencies shirking or abrogating responsibilities in the
delegation of some powers  but not others  to user groups? In
Africa co-management and user participation are also seen as
part of the introduction of political pluralism. The question then
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 22
A decade of fisheries co-management in Africa
Mafaniso Hara and Jesper Raakjær Nielsen
is: Is the real objective to enforce participatory democracy or to
achieve better fisheries management?
What should the objectives of co-management be? Institution
and capacity building? Can co-management achieve the
objectives of all role-players, given that these might not always
be exactly the same and often contradicting? How can the
balance between government conservation objectives and the
socio-economic needs of fishing communities be achieved? What
is understood to be sustainable exploitation by the various role
players anyway? These are some of the questions that
implementation of co-management in Africa raises and
governments, donors and researchers must wrestle with. Until
we start finding bold answers to them, co-management appears
more an illusion than the empowerment of fishing communities.
Endnotes
1. In the early 1990s, the World Bank also adopted
participatory approaches to project identification,
development and implementation (World Bank 1994). This
followed the dismal failure of the Integrated Rural
Development Programme, that it had launched in 1970,
which was based on a top-down interventionist approach
(Keare 2001).
2. The cases-studies from southern Africa and West Africa are
mainly drawn from volumes based on workshop proceedings
of the Institute of Fisheries Management and Coastal
Development (IFM)/International Centre for Living Aquatic
Resources Management (ICLARM)/National Aquatic
Resource Systems (NARS) Co-management Research Project
by Viswanathan (ed.) forthcoming, and Normann et al. (eds)
1998. Those for East Africa are based the experiences of the
Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project Phase II, Geheb &
Crean (eds) 2000. In addition, specific analysis of emerging
initiatives in South Africa (Hauck & Sowman 2001) are
included.
3. South Africa is the only country of the countries from which
these case-studies are drawn that is not officially
implementing SAPs.
4. Hara (2001) and Malasha (2001) elaborate attempts at
applying  indirect rule in the specific cases of fisheries
administration in Malawi (then called Nyasaland) and
Zambia (then called Northern Rhodesia) respectively by the
British colonial  governments.
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5. According to Lawry (1994), Western donors argue that better
resource management will result from policies that extend
clearer property rights to users and give greater authority to
local institutions, believed to be more accountable to the
public.
6. These arrangements primarily involve small-scale fisheries.
Except for co-management of the South African hake fishery
(Hutton et al. 1998), we have not found any well-
documented examples of co-management in the industrial
fisheries, although the authors are aware that consultative
arrangement are in place in some countries, e.g. the shrimp
fishery in Mozambique.
7. Berkes (1997) points out that all these are variations of
Arnsteins (1969)  ladder of public participation.
8. The Lake Malombe project in Malawi had been funded from
several sources, namely the German Technical Foundation
(GTZ), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
British Overseas Development Administration and a World
Bank loan (Hara 1998; Scholz et al. 1998). On Lake Kariba
the co-management project came under the Zambia/
Zimbabwe SADC Fisheries Project, funded by the Norwegian
Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD) and the
Danish International Development Agency (Danida)
(Hachongela et al. 1998). The Lake Victoria Fisheries
Research Project was funded by the European Development
Fund (Geheb & Crean 2000). In Mozambique the
implementation of co-management in Moma/Angoche
districts was part of Nampula Artisanal Fisheries Project,
funded by the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) (Lopes et al. 1998). While in West
Africa, the initiatives came under the Integrated
Development of Artisanal Fisheries in West Africa (IDAF),
funded by Danida (Horemans & Jallow 1998). Hauck and
Sowman (2001) point out that in South Africa most of the
initiatives had been funded by external agencies.
9. In most rural areas of Africa, the levels of formal employment
remain low. Usually, people rely on seasonal agriculture for
food and income. The rate of unemployment in such areas is
extremely high, usually in excess of 50%.
10. One of the major problems with the implementation of co-
management in Africa is that, in most cases, this is being
done as donor-funded projects of limited duration. Where
government cannot take over the funding of the activities, it
has been common to observe that the activities are
collapsing, leading to serious problems in the long-term
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success of the regime. The solution to this is long-term
commitment of human and financial resources for the
establishment of the new regimes
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